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This paper examines the pooling and separating contracts designed by Australasian financial 
intermediaries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  We show that after an initial 
screening process these agents altered interest rates and collateral requirements to separate out 
risk types to reveal additional information on borrowers.  In multi-period contracts agents opted 
for flexible contract structures which permitted changes in individual or community-wide 
circumstances.
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 Geographic remoteness and unfamiliarity with different geological and climatic conditions were 
the predominant challenges for Australasian farmers.  Local growing conditions were quite 
different from those in Britain where severe and prolonged droughts were unknown.  
International remoteness derived from Australasia’s geographical location and the initial absence 
of regular shipping services.  Local isolation was a reflection of the undeveloped infrastructure 
and, in Australia’s case, the vast geographic size of the country.  As agricultural settlement 
expanded inwards through Queensland, Victoria, and New South Wales in the 1870s and 1880s 
distances increased and farms became more remote from natural sea and river communications.1
Remoteness from other farming nations emphasised the difficulties of keeping up to date with 
best practice while local isolation between farms and farming communities slowed the 
development and diffusion of core knowledge of preferred techniques suitable for Australasian 
conditions.
Australasian farmers required financial support for a multitude of purposes including land 
improvement, freehold purchase, livestock acquisition, the development of permanent stations, 
export credits, new technology, and the impact of cyclical fluctuations in the industry.  The 
extent of farmer reliance on institutional support is difficult to calculate accurately although 
Butlin’s estimate that only one-third of capital formation in the sector was internally generated in 
1874 provides some indication of the demand for outside finds.2  Finance was supplied by 
numerous groups most particularly banks and specialist pastoral agents.
The characteristics of Australasian farming had implications for how financial 
intermediaries conducted business and particularly how they designed loan contracts.  In this 
paper we investigate the process by which financial intermediaries in Australasia designed loan 
contracts after organising farmers into risk groups, and the manner in which information costs, 
borrower actions, lender and borrower relations, and changes in individual and community-wide 
circumstances, influence contract design.The time period covered here is motivated by the fact 
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that, as Butlin notes, from the late nineteenth century there were two major suppliers of 
investible funds to the pastoral sector: commercial banks and specialised pastoral agencies.3
While there have been several works examining the role of banks in Australian economic 
development, there has been less attention directed to the role of pastoral agents.4  And yet 
several of these firms were to become some of the largest private sector organisations in the early 
twentieth century.The paper adds to our understanding of the development of the activities of 
financial intermediaries and of loan contracts that has recently received attention by American 
writers such as Lamoureaux, Calomiris, Snowden, and Guinnane.5  We argue that the behaviour 
of financial intermediaries servicing the Australasian pastoral sector provides a fruitful context 
for investigating loan contract design.  Specialist pastoral agent companies and trading banks 
have lent very large sums of money since the middle of the nineteenth century to an industry 
characterised by large and fluctuating risk levels both between individuals and over time.  The 
particular focus here is upon sheep farming in light of the fact that wool exports have been the 
prime staple of both nations. Farming communities characterised by geographic remoteness yet 
social cohesion have obliged lenders to bear high information search costs while enduring 
pressure not to discriminate between borrowers.  The development of sophisticated contract 
design which these circumstances engendered is thus an important story and one which is 
recorded by extant company records for all the leading pastoral agents particularly covering the 
period from the 1890s  to World War Two
I
There were three main sources of demand for pastoral finance by farmers.6  Short term seasonal 
finance covered the time lag between incurring marketing costs such as shearing, transport, 
insurance, and sale presentation, and receiving the proceeds from sales.  Since both inland and 
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overseas transport was slow and unreliable and most Australasian wool was sold in London in 
the mid nineteenth century, the demand for this form of finance was substantial and extended 
over about six months.7  With the development of steam-shipping, railways, roads, and the 
movement of the wool market back to Australasia by the early twentieth century the period of 
seasonal finance was shortened.8  Seasonal short term finance became cyclical medium term 
finance if low wool prices or poor harvests extended over several years so that the produce sales 
revenue was insufficient to cover the farmer’s debts.9  The periodic depressions and droughts 
particularly in the 1890s, early 1920s, and 1930s were times when farmers looked for crisis 
support.
Farmers additionally sought longer term loans to establish, extend, and modernise their 
business.  Loans of several years duration, for example, were required after a prolonged drought 
such as in the second half of the 1890s. Farming became more capital intensive in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. As permanent stations replaced nomadic herding, there was a 
greater need for capital improvements such as water bores, plant, paddocking, and fencing. The 
boom in dairying and the development of refrigeration from the 1880s introduced more complex 
technology into farming. With the movement inland away from the most fertile coastal regions, 
farmers were increasingly faced with having to buy an existing run or settle on poorer land, both 
requiring increased investment. In addition, there was a strong trend towards purchase of the 
freehold on the land as a result of legislation passed in the 1860s and 1870s.  Mortgages for farm 
purchase were often for three to five years.  Other legislative developments designed to support 
the expansion of the pastoral sector also facilitated the growth of borrowing.  The Lien on Wool 
and Livestock Act passed in New South Wales in 1843 and the Wool and Oil Securities Act in 
New Zealand in 1858 enabled pastoralists to borrow by giving security in the form of a 
preferable lien on an ensuing wool clip or by mortgaging livestock. Radical land policies towards 
the end of the century gave a further fillip to small scale farming by facilitating the sub-division 
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of large estates.10  Finally, the policies of providing land for returning soldiers after World War 
One initiated a further cohort of small and inexperienced farmers requiring finance to get 
established.
The main lenders to farmers were specialist pastoral agents, the trading banks, and private 
mortgagees. It is difficult to measure the absolute level of lending.  Although there was provision 
for mortgage registration, many farmers preferred informal loans, even if this meant higher 
interest rates, in order to keep their indebtedness out of the public and trading eye.11 Estimates of 
market share amongst different types of lender suggest the importance of pastoral agents; in 
Adelaide in 1934 they held 53 per cent of livestock mortgages compared with 25 per cent by the 
banks.12  Since banks lent across many other sectors their support of the pastoral sector was 
intermittent and often of low priority.13  In 1908 and 1913 bank lending to farmers had been cut 
back sharply.  On the first occasion they diverted funds to into state government securities at tax 
concessional rates and on the second revealed a preference for their ‘commercial customers 
whose business in exchange and discounts is more liquid and profitable’.14  In general, bank 
support for the pastoral sector was regarded as ‘reasonably conservative’.15  This was initially 
the consequence of conservative attitudes towards lending on rural real estate inherited from 
British banking principles.  However, caution was also borne of the problems lending to a highly 
volatile sector where the banks knew relatively little about many small scale remote producers.  
As an alternative strategy banks frequently lent indirectly to pastoralists through specialist 
pastoral agents as financial intermediaries.
The specialist pastoral agents lent only to this sector and, through a range of trading, 
technical, and financial exchanges with farmers knew a great deal about farming and the 
businesses of individual farmers.  Such information intense relationships helped to overcome the 
barriers of remoteness and unfamiliarity.  Since credit markets rely heavily upon information as a 
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signalling mechanism this meant pastoral agents were well placed to make good lending 
decisions in an industry characterised by high and fluctuating levels of uncertainty.
This reciprocity of information flows between farmer and agent promoted honesty and 
trust as a basis for long term dealings between farmer and agent. It also offset the agent's 
frequent disadvantage of more expensive access to funds than banks by tying loans to the 
guarantee of trading business. Indeed, for many pastoral agents it was optimal to offer finance at 
zero economic profit (or even at a loss) because the present discounted value of expected income 
streams more than outweighed the total costs of finance provision.  As one firm noted in 
comparing the rates at which they borrowed and relent the same funds, ‘the difference of interest 
is not enough to pay for the risk...[but]...we are always prepared to take up business at current 
rates of interest, as we know that it is not so much the interest on the advance but the wool 
selling business which goes with it which is profitable.’16
In the mid nineteenth century most pastoral agencies were small local organisations which 
addressed the informational problems associated with distance by fostering close contacts within 
the local farming community.  Thus, social and kinship ties as well as economic transactions  
were the basis for reciprocity.17  By the end of the century phases of growth and merger had 
increased concentration levels amongst pastoral agents so that a small number of national firms 
dominated the industry. By 1910 the leading five pastoral agents in each country accounted for 
more than a half of wool sales in Australia and New Zealand, a market share which was 
maintained through the first half of the twentieth century (see Table 1 below).
Table 1. Financial intermediaries market share by wool brokerage, 1891-1940
about here
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Tables 2 and 3 reveal that the ‘big five’ came from the same six or seven firms throughout 
most of the period.  Given the close linkages between lending and consignment business we 
would expect the market share of wool brokerage to give a rough indication of market share in 
the finance market.18  The existence of such a stable oligopoly meant firms were very conscious 
of the actions of their competitors in developing their policies. 
Table 2. Average market share (%) of Australian wool-brokers, 1891-1940
about here
Table 3. Average market share (%) of New Zealand wool-brokers, 1911-40
about here
Pastoral agents, which included Dalgety, Goldsbrough Mort, and New Zealand Loan and 
Mercantile Agency, were amongst the largest, most enduring, and most organisationally 
sophisticated corporations in Australia and New Zealand.  Table 4 shows that they dominated big 
business in Australia, occupying five of the top ten positions in 1910 including the largest 
company, Dalgety. This experience and resources enabled them to devise effective information 
acquisition and processing techniques and maintain extensive networks of branches in the main 
farming districts.19 This was backed up with fleets of automobiles to make regular on-farm 
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visits, and the establishment of information departments which kept detailed records about all 
relevant aspects of the businesses of their farmer clients.  As we show later it was these dominant 
firms which were particularly associated with the design of loan contracts, and the examples we 
describe are representative of these businesses’ activities.20  Moreover, these firms advanced 
along a learning curve, adjusting their contractual strategies in the light of previous experience.
Table 4. Pastoral agents in the top one hundred Australian companies (rank order)
about here
That loans were so important to pastoral agents in securing business and that the penalties 
for getting it wrong were so great, in terms of large debts based on illiquid and volatile 
securities, meant that agents paid a great deal of attention to accurate risk categorisation and 
appropriate contract design.  While banks diversified their lending across many sectors and loan 
types, the focussed attention of agency companies on pastoral finance justifies a considered look 
at their approach to contract design under the specific conditions of this sector.
II
Finance providers aim to attract as many low risk borrowers as possible while rejecting higher 
risk clients or setting differential terms for them which provide the lender with a risk premium.  
The economic literature on loan contract design under conditions of information asymmetries 
and adverse selection tells us that financial intermediaries will invest in information on borrower 
types when the gains to acquiring information outweigh the costs of collecting it.21  In such 
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circumstances lenders will design contracts according to risk in order to increase profit 
outcomes.
Imperfect information introduces two opposing effects on the welfare of the agent and the 
farmer.  First, since information is imperfect additional uncertainty is introduced into the agent-
farmer relationship.  Second, the inclusion of monitoring can motivate the farmer to take actions 
that would make both agent and farmer better off; for example, taking more care in working the 
farm.  When farmers are risk averse and information is incomplete any contract that depends on 
cost and choice is strictly Pareto superior to a contract that depends solely on cost.22  Thus, in the 
case under review we would expect to find loan contracts based upon interest rates and a signal 
for riskiness such as collateral.
Agents categorised farmers into borrower types in order to design separating contracts 
whereby low risk farmers were offered lower interest rates than high risk farmers, but were 
required to provide greater amounts of collateral.  Constructing a risk profile of farmers required 
an appropriate weighting of the type of loan, the collateral provided, the character of the client, 
the nature of the activity, the condition of the assets employed, the sector-wide prospects for this 
activity during the course of the loan, and the volume of trading business likely to be generated.  
The highest risk loans were station mortgages where the asset was most illiquid and its value 
liable to considerable fluctuation over the course of the loan according to its maintenance as well 
as changes in industry-wide conditions.  However, by tying in the borrower for a longer period of 
time it provided stronger guarantees of sustained trading revenues (that is, ensuring access to 
consignment business).  
The nature and degree of collateral affected the potential losses to the agent in the case of 
default.  Companies generally lent to a maximum of 75 or 80 per cent of the value of collateral 
which was normally the asset for which the loan was provided.23  Given the fluctuating nature of 
the value of farm collateral in a highly cyclical industry this was the very maximum which would 
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be lent to a low risk customer.  First mortgages were naturally preferable to second or third 
although the latter were also considered while taking account of who the first mortgagee was and 
the respective loan security ratios. Alternative collateral included life insurance policies, 
personal guarantees of another person, and other tangible assets belonging to the borrower.
The character of the client clearly had a major bearing on the riskiness of the loan 
particularly in situations where monitoring was difficult and expensive.  Anything less than very 
positive signals would rank the loan as risky.  Agents looked for previous successful experience 
in farming with evidence of industriousness and acumen focussed upon this activity.  With 
existing customers this was not such a difficult task especially where the agent had other clients 
in the area with which to compare performance.  Long term clients who had survived previous 
downturns in the industry were regarded as a particularly low risk.  Where the borrower was 
unknown to the firm it drew heavily upon references and personal discussions.  Since farming 
was very much a family unit evidence of dependency or of support from other family members 
was also an important consideration.24
With regard to the nature of the activity, pastoral agents naturally regarded sheep farming 
as the lowest risk, since this was the area with which they were most familiar and were geared to 
providing support services.  However, related new or expanding rural industries provided 
important opportunities for agents, particularly dairy production, frozen meat, tallow boiling, and 
flax growing each of which yielded trading income and the efficiency benefits of economies of 
scope through technological and marketing concentricities. More risky was diversification into 
unrelated activities and where limited trading income was generated.  Such examples included 
the finance of trading and transport enterprises.  When the firm Murray Roberts decided to 
finance the South Sea trading account of Goodwin and De Lisle in 1890 they looked carefully 
into the activity and were confident that these old clients would be successful. They proved to be 
incorrect, misjudging the risks and key features of this activity.25  The condition of the assets 
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employed in a farming business, irrespective of whether they were mortgaged to the agent, 
would affect the ability to generate profits and repay the loan.  Agent inspectors paid close 
attention to the condition of the land, the buildings, and the machinery employed. Poor 
conditions might be due to local factors, such as low rainfall or rabbit infestation, or the result of 
neglect; either way it indicated a struggling or neglected business which might require additional 
support in the near future.
Finally, since the major aim of pastoral loans was to secure trading business, an important 
consideration was the amount of produce consignment and brokerage income which the new 
account was likely to generate.  Firms had a well defined ratio between the amount to be lent and 
the anticipated volume of business.  In 1921 the Union Mortgage and Agency Co. in reviewing 
its client list believed that the 1200 sheep owned by one borrower was insufficient business for 
his loan of £1500 while another owed £4000 which was too much for only 1800 sheep.26
However, if the ratio was particularly favourable this might offset other risky elements in the 
loan application itself.  New Zealand Loan explicitly sought a ten per cent return on the capital 
tied up in lending to a client and this could be calculated as the aggregate of loan repayments and 
income from business.27
Pastoral agents characterised the majority of their clients as medium to high risk concerns.  
Indeed, as we have shown above, the low risk classification was usually only applied to well 
established farmers with a sound credit history who had business with agents over many years if 
not a generation.  Given this distribution of risk types it was optimal for agents to invest in 
information on borrower type, and initially use two pooling contracts, for high and low risk 
farmers.28  Agents were clearly aware of the incentive problems associated with offering a single 
pooling contract that would have to be fully collaterised; as Goldsbrough Mort noted of high risk 
farmers, ‘where an owner has but little margin there is some temptation for him to speculate by 
trying experiments, by overstocking or gambling with seasons with the hope of strengthening his 
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position by making a big hit and as he has nothing to lose if a smash should occur we will be the
sufferers’.29  After distinguishing risk types agents offered two incentive compatible contracts 
such that it was hoped high risk farmers would opt for the low collateral contract while low risk 
farmers choose the high collateral contract.  The information gathering difficulties generated by 
the remoteness and unfamiliarity of Australasian pastoralism meant that the two pooled contracts 
provided only a broad form of risk classification.  After the initial sorting tasks, therefore, agents 
drew upon their experience and resources to further separate out farmers who were willing to 
work harder if a contract required higher collateral, recognising that higher collateral may induce 
higher work effort whereas a higher interest rate induced a lower work effort.30  The intuition 
here is that when a farmer posts higher collateral, the farmer’s loss when the project fails will 
increase and there is an incentive for the farmer to reduce the probability of failure by working 
harder.  By contrast, when the interest rate increases each farmer’s net payoff in successful states 
(that is, after the loan is repaid) decreases, inducing less effort.31  Thus, agents adopted a two-
stage process which reflected the use of pooling and separating contracts.
Examples of separating contracts are not difficult to find inspite of the view of one 
historian that, ‘before 1930...relatively uniform rates and commissions were charged leaving 
firms free to compete by offering more attractive services or by extending branch networks’.32
Two decades earlier the Union Mortgage had agreed a loan at the low rate of 5 per cent interest 
noting, ‘competitors have offered to take business on the terms named in which event valuable 
existing business will be lost’.33  Further back still in June 1899 General Manager Niall 
persuaded the Board of Goldsbrough Mort to approve the reduction of interest rates on high 
yielding accounts with ample security from six to five per cent in response to this action by 
competing firms.  This was the conclusion of an ongoing debate about whether to offer 
discriminating rates on which the previous meeting had taken the view that all accounts should 
be charged 6 per cent.34  Although the differential margin was normally no more than one per 
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cent, in 1896 Denny Lascelles agreed a loan at 5.5 per cent when the prevailing rates were 7-8 
per cent.35  Tougher conditions were set for higher risk clients. Thus, National Mortgage and 
Agency and Otago Farmers charged an extra half per cent interest for unsecured loans and New 
Zealand Loan raised a client's rate when less than the expected amount of wool was consigned 
through the firm.36  Other forms of non-price discrimination  occasionally adopted for higher risk 
customers after the initial screening process included establishment fees of several per cent of 
the value of the loan, a late payment penalty of about two per cent and an early payout charge of 
three months interest.37
The use of collateral as a tool of contract design was learnt by the leading firms over the 
course of the first half of the twentieth century.  In the nineteenth century most pastoral loans 
were unsecured and relied on local trust networks.  As NMA noted in 1921, ‘in the past we were 
compelled in the majority of cases to accept a moral security, and if we attempted to ask for a 
proper legal security, it generally resulted in the client paying us off’.38  However, conditions and 
attitudes changed in the industry.  The financial losses suffered by most of the firms in the 1890s 
crisis were an important influence.  In addition, the gradual expansion of large national firms 
meant the breakdown of local social networking and the emergence of experienced well 
resourced firms able to experiment with new policies. These firms were also conscious of their 
competitive position;  NMA noted competitors would be less willing to try and win over a firm’s 
good clients when their assets were secured to that firm.39
Since the loan contract was part of broader contractual arrangements between the farmer 
and his agent, discriminating terms might be provided in a variety of other ways which were not 
embodied in the loan agreement itself.  These might include lower consignment commissions, 
commission rebates, and discount on items purchased through the firm's outlets.  One 
particularly favoured Otago Farmers customer received 18 per cent discount on purchases at a 
time when 2.5 to 5 per cent was more common.40  The firm also resorted to offering free 
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woolpacks to particular customers while Goldsbrough Mort provided for a 20 per cent rebate on 
wool commissions in 1934.41  Differential terms of service included the agent visiting the farmer 
at home rather than the latter coming into the office.  In the case of the preferred Otago Farmers' 
client mentioned above, lower prices were supported by delivery of the goods to the farm gate.  
Self interest was never far behind, the managing director noting of a visit to the farm, ‘I gathered 
an immense amount of information from him with regard to the district generally’.42
III
Agents faced various constraints on their desire to separate out contracts.  Most obviously 
individual contracts cost more to establish and operate.  The initial risk assessment involved high 
set up costs in the form of information search followed by the design and negotiation of non-
standard contractual conditions.  The geographic remoteness of many farms and diminishing 
returns to search meant that decisions were made under conditions of imperfect knowledge.  
Where search costs for a particular account began to rise, for example through the need for 
additional personal and financial information, this often signalled to the company that a 
significant risk was involved.  Reputable applicants were generally easier to identify. Over time 
further information would emerge in the course of trading and the flexible nature of contractual 
arrangements allowed for subsequent modifications of the conditions.  Otago Farmers noted of 
their rural outlets that ‘the country members of the staff are the eyes and ears of the 
Institution’.43  Firms also learned means of standardising search methods to reduce costs such as 
printed loan proposal forms which requested information on an applicant's antecedents, 
character, capabilities, connections, collateral, other accounts, and anticipated business with the 
firm.  Murray Roberts regularised reporting methods through a printed annual report form 
dealing with the critical areas of risk.44
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These establishment policies were vital since incorrect initial decisions raised transaction 
costs during the course of the loan.  Close monitoring of problem accounts involved visits to the 
farm and the writing of detailed reports which were discussed at length in Board meetings.  The 
directors of all the companies spent much of their time discussing a limited number of problem 
accounts, a point which the Otago Farmers' chief creditor, the Bank of New Zealand, was quick 
to point out.45  Enforcement costs rose as agents negotiated amended contractual conditions in 
an attempt to oblige compliance or force the client off their books and, in extreme cases, 
foreclosed on the account.46
Borrower actions influenced the extent of contract separation.  High risk customers sent 
out mixed signals to lenders in order to make the process of separation more complex and 
expensive.  As we have argued, toughening the interest rate terms for an existing client might 
invoke adverse selection and moral hazard problems if the farmer was a high risk type and took 
this as a signal that his case was nigh on hopeless; George Whyte of Glenledi was, ‘feathering 
his nest with a view to walking off the property’.47  On the other hand, it was in the best interests 
of low risk farmers to identify themselves as low risk by signalling credibly to agents or else risk 
being mistaken as a high risk type.48  The extent to which very good risks were shown particular 
favour was influenced by their volubility in playing off agents against each other.  Hugh O'Hare 
asked Pitt, Son and Badgery to reduce his interest rate from 6.5 to 5 per cent in August 1913, 
observing that he had offers from two other firms at the lower rate. The firm responded by 
offering 6 per cent.49  Falconer, the London manager of Australian Mercantile Loan and Finance, 
bemoaned in 1907 the lack of loyalty of clients who, ‘are not restrained by a feeling of gratitude 
for previous liberal treatment from exacting all they can’.50
The willingness and ability of agents to respond to borrower demands and actions was 
heavily influenced by the relationship between the different lenders, particularly the degree to 
which they shared information about clients and their own policies.  While Tsokhas is incorrect 
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to suggest that there was no price competition between lending firms before 1930, he is right to 
point to the importance of the ‘brokers’ associations and the close, informal relationship between 
the [agents]’.51  Although agents clearly competed with each other to obtain the lowest risk 
customers, they appear to have shared general economic and farming information.  The fact that 
many farmers were indebted to several firms at once provided an incentive for mutual 
information exchange between lenders.  The extent of inter-firm cooperation varied from time to 
time but even where levels of trust were low, client risk assessment was unavoidably signalled 
through firm action.  Thus, if a firm's level of rate discrimination was known to other firms this 
indicated which of these farmers they might attempt to entice and those whose applications 
ought to be treated with some degree of scepticism.52
Cooperation between pastoral agents and banks also helped to spread information costs.  
While both types of institution competed for pastoral loans they also complemented each other 
when banks more commonly provided personal banking services to a client who was financially 
linked to an agent.  A further reason for cooperation was that the major banks were often the 
ultimate source of much of the supply of funds for many of the medium sized and smaller agents.  
In 1898 when Fitzwilliam Wentworth refused to provide all the necessary financial details 
requested by the Australian Mercantile the firm approached the Bank of New South Wales who 
confirmed that he had an ample margin of security and was considered a good risk.53
Equally important were the relationships among borrowers and the extent to which they 
shared information about their own position and that of the agents with which they transacted.  
Lenders sought to suppress information about differential terms to other borrowers as well as 
competing firms for fear that this would lead to pressure from other customers whom the firm 
wished to retain.  In spite of the emphasis upon confidentiality among company officers the close 
social and kinship links within rural communities meant it was often difficult to prevent the 
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spread of such information.  The restraints on offering lower interest rates to low risk customers 
were clearly recognised as Australian Mercantile noted:
‘I am most anxious to see an increase in the earnings of the Company but the fact 
of the relationship between many of our clients, and a number of them residing on 
properties adjoining other clients, together with the possibility of them being taken 
up elsewhere, makes the question of differentiating in the interest rates charged to 
existing clients appear to me to be a somewhat dangerous one’.54
Likewise, the problems of differential action against high risks was also noted by the firm: 
‘There exists among our clients so many close family connections that extreme caution has to be 
exercised in dealing summarily with those whom it might be desirable to be quit of’.55
Alternatively, low risk customers might also be offended if they believed the company was 
offering identical terms to more risky clients, especially after the initial screening process had 
been completed. 
IV
In any single period contract the agent aimed to deter strategic default by increasing the amount 
of monitoring of the contract and imposing collateral requirements.  However, when loan 
contracts existed over several periods it became possible for pastoral agents also to draw upon 
self-enforcement mechanisms in order to achieve contract completion.  The necessity of multi-
period loan contracts in the agricultural sector meant that farmers and agents had to bear in mind 
the impact of opportunistic behaviour on future economic opportunities.  Myopic shirking 
behaviour by the farmer (or even by the agent) was deterred since any action in the current 
period also affected future earnings.  Once multi-period (or long term) contracts existed then the 
incentive compatibility condition of any separated contract was altered such that the farmer's 
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failure to repay the loan now involved a loss of reputation and future utility.  In subsequent 
periods it may be harder for the farmer to obtain finance.56
Besides reputational effects, multi-period contract design was also affected by the severe 
cyclical vicissitudes which have characterised the pastoral industry.  Difficult periods have 
included the Australian drought years of the 1890s, and the collapse of primary produce prices 
during the interwar slump.  The severe impact which pastoral depressions had on the social and 
economic fabric of rural communities inevitably affected contractual relations.  The influences 
upon contracting discussed in the previous sections were all affected.  Closer supervision of 
problem accounts raised costs at a time when firms were trying to economise and left little 
margin for expenditure on attracting new clients.  Firms found themselves faced with requests 
for favourable treatment from high risk clients more than low risk ones who had sought lower 
rates in better times.  Lenders began to show less regard for customer loyalty and borrowers for 
honest behaviour, albeit within the bounds placed upon their actions by the welfare losses 
associated with a loss of reputation.  Conversely, cooperative behaviour was induced among 
lenders desperate to shore up their rate and commission positions and to consolidate mortgagee 
rights held jointly over different accounts.
In prosperous periods when firms had plenty of money to lend many proposals were 
supported and mostly under standard conditions as firms struggled to keep pace with the 
opportunities for additional business.  In 1909 and several following years Goldsbrough Mort 
were accepting most loan applications and these decisions were being taken by the General 
Manager without reference to the Board for approval.57  Branch managers were also given 
greater latitude in loan approvals which sometimes led to Board level directives for greater 
discrimination.58 However, failure to understand the extent of client exit costs meant that 
indiscriminate policies in boom periods built in latent problems which would only become 
apparent during economic downturns.  Other weakening clients who simply survived on the 
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firm's books through the alternative restraints on separation discussed above, such as loyalty and 
community factors, added to this problem. 
Agents took a much more conservative line with new loan applicants during downturns, 
realising that many of their existing customers were running into greater debt.  In 1893 
Australian Mercantile emphasised that safety was their prime consideration and that they had 
refused all new loan applications in the previous year in order to concentrate upon supporting 
their existing clients.59  In a similar downturn two decades later the firm modified its strategy so 
that it would only take on new accounts which yielded large commissions; other applications, 
even with ample security, yielded insufficient ‘contingent returns from wool and produce’.60  It 
is not clear whether this meant a shift in emphasis between pooling and separating for any new 
borrowers but for existing clients there were some highly significant policy developments.  
As prices fell during downturns and prospects looked poor many accounts began to run at a 
loss.  Indebtedness to agents and banks increased as produce sales failed to cover short term 
produce advances and periodic mortgage payments could not be met. Many farmers became 
discouraged in their efforts and in some cases the forms of opportunism alluded to above became 
more common.  Agents were opposed to foreclosing on most of these customers unless 
mismanagement or opportunism was contributing significantly to excessive debt levels.  
Foreclosure meant extra administration if the firm ran the farm, and loss of commissions and 
capital write-offs if it was sold.  Realisation of capital losses was a serious risk for agents whose 
own weakening financial status put at risk the support of banks and farmer creditors who were 
likewise going through severe difficulties.  Moreover, since downturns were known to be 
cyclical many agents sought to bring their struggling clients through to better times and used this 
argument to maintain support among their own creditors.
The fact that exit costs rose to such high levels in periods of downturn had a major impact 
on contractual policies for existing clients.  Individual clients were affected differently by the 
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depression depending upon farm specific features such as cash reserves, entrepreneurial spirit, 
and production flexibility.  The impact did not accord closely to the original risk categories and 
therefore required agents to re-rate their clients' accounts as being in a stronger or weaker 
condition.  Discriminating against the weaker accounts would worsen problems of effort and 
honesty and was unlikely to offload the farmer onto other firms adopting highly conservative 
new loans policies.  Thus, agents with experience of the 1890s downturn developed a modified 
form of contractual separation during the interwar depression: the weakest accounts, where 
foreclosure was ruled out, were charged the lowest rates of interest and in some cases no interest 
at all.  In 1932 Goldsbrough Mort had a list of clients who were being provided with relief by a 
rate reduction or a partial debt write-off.61  In 1931 40 per cent of Dalgety's New South Wales 
clients did not meet all their financial commitments to the firm.  Such concessions may also have 
helped improve the condition of farms so that their value could be kept within range of the debt 
burden and some could be sold off once any indication of improved conditions began to occur.62
It was also hoped that by creating goodwill clients would be encouraged to cut their own costs 
although careful monitoring was required to ensure the need was genuine and did not lead to 
interest suspension being taken as a free gift.  Such a policy was not advanced without some 
concern for the justice of it and the likely negative signals to better clients; the London Secretary 
of Dalgety despaired that, ‘at a time when thoroughly deserving clients require every assistance, 
the company’s funds should be in the hands of undeserving clients’.63
Agency firms were more divided about the degree of separation for other groups of clients.  
In 1931 Dalgety had moved away from the normal low and high risk categories to a more 
complex set of contracts.  It separated its accounts into hopeless, hopeful, and sound, all interest 
being suspended on the first, partial interest on the second, and full payment being made on the 
third.64  In 1933 Dalgety, Elders and Goldsbrough Mort were involved in a rate agreement to fix 
a standard level for clients whose interest had not been suspended.  However, Goldsbrough Mort 
had some reservations about this approach, ‘as surely a first class well secured account is entitled 
22
to a better rate...we are not prepared to lose business we value on a question of rate’.65
Goldsbrough Mort and Australian Mercantile also moved to a three risk categorisation but 
discriminated in favour of both the best and worst risks, leaving the ‘reasonably safe’ accounts to 
pay a higher standard rate.  In a previous crisis in the 1890s Australian Mercantile went as far as 
to advocate reducing their overdrawn list by calling in the advances of those who could afford to 
pay, presumably referring to the hopeful or reasonably safe accounts.66  This obviously carried 
some risk of losing trading business from such accounts but was vital to reduce the agent’s own 
costs and left them to concentrate on retaining the good accounts and maybe attracting some 
additional ones.  Although new gilt edged accounts with high trading volumes would still be 
welcomed during depressions, the ability to distinguish risk levels was constrained by the need 
for cost cutting and lower prices.  This dilemma led Otago Farmers to spend much time in the 
1930s discussing the costs and benefits of its network, periodically opening and closing different 
branches.  An alternative policy of working on attracting untied customers presented similar 
problems as Goldsbrough Mort noted, ‘it is a matter for consideration whether the cost 
(increased advertising, additional travellers, entertainment money etc) which would be incurred 
in inducing further free business would be recouped by the commission earned’.67
V
Our study of the Australasian pastoral sector indicates that specialist lending agents  understood 
many of the incentive compatibility conditions involved in contract design and put them into 
practice before World War Two.  They recognised the importance of investing in information as 
a basis for categorising risk levels.  The incentives in the contract were then structured in a 
manner compatible with the risk levels identified.  Thus, lower risk clients are attracted by a 
reduced interest rate and will work harder if higher collateral is required.  At the same 
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time agents accepted that there were constraints on the design of separate contracts at the 
commencement of the loan.  These particularly included the high information costs associated 
with Australasian conditions together with the limitations imposed by borrower or lender 
relations.  Diverse trading relations between the agent firm and its farmers, however, spread 
information costs across a range of activities and revealed further information which might lead 
to an adjusted risk assessment and consequent modification of the contract.Contracts and risk 
categories also had to be reassessed in light of the rapidly changing environmental conditions 
which characterised farming and could affect different farms in distinct ways.  Thus, some firms 
moved from a two to a three tier system of risk analysis during the interwar crisis.  
 The historical evidence largely relates to the dominant wool growing sector in the half 
century between 1890 and 1940.  This period witnessed two major downturns enabling firms to 
learn from previous experience and modify their lending strategies. The leading agency firms 
were among the largest and most well organised businesses of the period and developed their 
own corporate memories.  Firms like Goldsbrough Mort and New Zealand Loan which had been 
through the rural depression of the 1890s coped with the interwar crisis better than more recent 
entrants like Otago Farmers. Until further empirical studies are completed we cannot know how 
common it was for lenders to apply these principles of contract design at this time. However, our 
evidence suggests that such practices were particularly suited to financial intermediaries that 
were well resourced, enduring, and specialised in lending and trading with a particular sector. 
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Table 1. Financial intermediaries average market share by wool brokerage (%), 
1891-1940
Australia New Zealand
Year 2 firm 4 firm 5 firm 2 firm 4 firm 5 firm
1891-1900 30 48 55 - - -
1901-10 27 44 51 33 46 51
1911-20 28 43 49 29 42 48
1921-30 27 45 52 28 44 50
1931-40 26 43 51 30 46 52
Sources: Dalgety Annual Wool Review; Australian Insurance and Banking Record; New 
Zealand Woolbrokers’ Association, Turnbull Library.
Table 2. Average market share (%) of Australian wool-brokers, 1891-1940
Year Dalgety NZLMA ES GM AMLF WC
1891-1900 10.3 12.7 3.7 16.6
1901-1910 15.2 11.3 4.1 10.3 5.7 7.4
1911-1920 18.2 10.2 5.4 6.9 7.0 6.5
1921-1930 15.7 9.8 6.8 9.6 9.2 7.6
1931-1940 15.6 8.3 6.6 10.6 8.4 7.8
Notes:
NZL = New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency; ES = Elder Smith; GM = Goldsbrough Mort; 
AMLF = Australian Mercantile Loan and Finance; and WC = Winchcombe CarsonSources:
Dalgety Annual Wool Review; Australian Insurance and Banking Record.
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Table 3. Average market share (%) of New Zealand wool-brokers, 1911-1940
Year Dalgety NZLMA WS NMA MR Pyne Levin
1911-1920 18.6 10.6 5.1 6.2 6.0 4.7 5.5
1921-1930 18.4 9.6 8.0 6.6 5.8 6.4 6.6
1931-1940 19.0 11.8 8.7 7.1 5.4 5.8 5.5
Notes:
NZLMA = New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency; WS = Wright Stephenson;
NMA = National Mortgage and Agency; MR = Murray Roberts.
Sources: Dalgety Annual Wool Review; New Zealand Woolbrokers’ Association, Turnbull 
Library.
Table 4. Pastoral agents in the top one hundred Australian companies (rank order)
Company 1910 1930
Dalgety 1 2
New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency 4 8
Australian Mercantile and Loan Finance 6 16
Goldsbrough Mort 8 7
Elder Smith 10 10
Source: S.P. Ville and D. Merrett, ‘The development of large scale enterprise in Australia, 
1910-64’, Business History, 42, 3 (2000).
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